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Abstract
We study the problem of inheritance and capital income optimal
taxation in an economy with migration. In particular, we analyze the
role played by the weights attached to the individual utility functions
in the social welfare function. If these weights correspond to the de-
mographic weights, the disconnection brought in by migration is the
underlying reason for non zero optimal tax rates.
J.E.L. classification: E62, H21.
Keywords: optimal dynamic taxation, migration, altruism, inheritance
taxation, capital income taxation.
1 Introduction
The issue of inheritance taxation is very similar to that of capital income
taxation, once they are analyzed within the optimal taxation framework:
should one tax own future consumption and estate (i.e. perspective heirs’
consumption) more than own present consumption?
As for capital income taxation, starting from the seminal works by Judd
(1985) and Chamley (1986), the issue of dynamic optimal capital income
taxation has been analyzed by a number of researchers. In particular, Judd
(1999) has shown that the zero tax rate result stems from the fact that a tax
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on capital income is equivalent to a tax on future consumption: thus, capital
income should not be taxed if the elasticity of consumption is constant over
time. However, while in infinitely lived representative agent (ILRA) models1
this condition is necessarily satisfied in the long run, along the transition
path, instead, it holds only if the utility function is assumed to be (weakly)
separable in consumption and leisure and homothetic in consumption. An-
other source of taxation can derive from the presence of externalities, which
gives room to nonzero taxation as a Pigouvian correction device2. Aban-
doning the standard ILRA framework in favour of Overlapping Generation
models with life cycle (OLG-LC)3 has delivered another important case of
nonzero capital income taxation. This outcome can be understood by reckon-
ing that in such a setup optimal consumption and labor (or, more precisely,
the general equilibrium elasticity of consumption) are generally not constant
over life and even at the steady state, due to life-cycle behavior.
A similar reasoning can be applied to estate taxation. Note that this cor-
responds to a differential treatment of savings for own future consumption,
on the one hand, and of savings for bequest, on the other hand. Thus, the
first aspect to note is that the optimality of a nonzero tax on capital income
does not necessarily imply the optimality of a nonzero tax on estates. In fact
the latter can be justified on arguments analogous to those presented above:
a nonzero estate tax could stem either from the violation of (weak) separa-
bility between ”expenditure” on estate and (previous period) leisure or from
a difference between the donor’s and the donee’s general equilibrium elastic-
ities of consumption, according to the framework being analyzed. Another
reason for levying a tax on inheritance could be correcting for an externality.
Atkinson (1971) and Stiglitz (1987) consider the positive externality deriving
from the fact that transfers benefit those who receive them. Holtz-Eakin et
al. (1993), Imbens et al. (1999), Joulfaian et al. (1994) consider instead the
negative externality deriving, in the presence of an income tax, from a fall in
heirs’ labor efforts. In the field of estate and transfers in general, the anal-
ysis of the motives for giving is another important aspect. In fact, different
motives are associated to different forms of utility functions and, as a conse-
quence, to different policy effects. Altruism, joy of giving, exchange related
motives, accidental bequests have been widely studied in the literature (see
Davies, 1996; Masson and Pestieau, 1997; Stark, 1999; Kaplow, 2001).
1See Atkeson et al. (1999) and Chari et al. (1999).
2See De Bonis and Spataro (2005), where the externality argument is applied to the
case of differing social and private discounting in an ILRA framework and relatively to
capital income taxation.
3See Atkinson and Sandmo (1980) and Erosa and Gervais (2002); for a review see Erosa
and Gervais (2001).
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In this paper we consider altruism motivated bequests. However, we
introduce an element that is not considered in the existing models, i.e. the
presence of migration. Moreover, we allow for a disconnection in the economy,
in that we assume altruism to be limited to own descendants4. This element
turns out to be a relevant determinant of taxation once it is embedded in the
social welfare function, and precisely in the sense that the policymaker takes
into account the demographic evolution of the population. In fact, the zero
capital income and inheritance tax result applies only if the disconnection of
the economy is disregarded. We identify instead a number of ways in which
the demographic evolution of the population can be accounted for within the
social welfare function via appropriate intergenerational weights, leading to
different combinations of the inheritance and capital income tax rates, with
at least one of them being nonzero.
The work proceeds as follows: in section 2 we present the model and
derive the equilibrium conditions for the decentralized economy. Next, we
characterize the Ramsey problem by adopting the primal approach. Finally,
we present the results by focusing on the new ones. Concluding remarks and
a technical appendix will end the work.
2 The model
We consider a neoclassical-production-closed economy in which there is a
large number of agents and firms.
Private agents, who are endowed with identical preferences, differ as for
their date of entry into the economy, s; natives are supposed to have entered
the economy at time s = 0, when also the economy starts, while migrants
start entering at time s = 1; agents live two periods: in the first period
they receive an inheritance from their parents, work and consume; in the
second period, they consume, give birth to (1 + n) children and leave them
a bequest upon dying; at the same time, in each period migrants enter the
economy at a given rate α, proportional to the number of young individuals
populating the economy: as a consequence, the population growth rate is
equal to (1 + pi) = (1 + n)(1 + α) .
4The relevance of the “disconnectedness” of the economy has been firstly analyzed by
Blanchard (1985), Buiter (1988) and Weil (1989). The latter shows, in a scenario with a
continuous arrival in the economy of new individuals who are not linked to pre-existing
cohorts, that finite horizons are not a necessary condition for the violation of the Ricardian
equivalence. Analogously, in this work we show that finite horizons, or, more precisely,
life cycle behavior, is not a necessary condition for the violation of the zero capital income
and estate tax result in OLG models.
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We normalize the size of the population at time 0 to unity, so that the
whole population at time t has cardinality:
Nt = (1 + pi)
t−1 (2 + pi)
and the size of each dynasty (started off with the entry of the founder) is:
Ds,t = α(1 + pi)
s−1(2 + n) (1 + n)t−s ,
with s ≤ t.
Moreover, all individuals offer labor and capital services to firms by tak-
ing the net-of-tax factor prices, w˜s,t and r˜s,t as given. Firms, which are
identical to each other, own a constant return to scale technology F satisfy-
ing the Inada conditions and which transforms the factors into production-
consumption units. Finally, the government can finance an exogenous stream
of public expenditure Gt, by issuing internal debt Bt and by raising propor-
tional taxes both on interests, wages and inheritance, referred to as τ ks,t, τ
l
s,t
and τxs,t respectively. Notice that taxes can be conditioned on the date of
birth of both dynasties and individuals.
2.1 Private agents
Agents’ preferences can be represented by the following instantaneous utility
function:
U = U1
(
c1s,t, ls,t
)
+ βU2(c2s,t+1) =
2∑
i=1
βi−1U i,
where β is the intertemporal discount rate, c1s,t, c
2
s,t+1 and ls,t are consumption
in the first (young) and second (old) period of life and labor supply, respec-
tively, of the individual born in period t and belonging to the dynasty started
in period s. Such a utility function is strictly increasing in consumption and
decreasing in labor, strictly concave, and satisfies the standard Inada condi-
tions. Since we assume that individuals care about the well being of their
children, and defining γ > 0 the “degree of altruism” of parents towards
descendants, agents maximize the following utility function:
max
{c1s,t,ls,t,c2s,t+1}∞t
∞∑
t=s
δt−s
2∑
i=1
βi−1U i (1)
sub w˜s,tls,t + xs,t(1− τxs,t) = c1s,t +
c2s,t + xs,t+1(1 + n)
(1 + r˜s,t+1)
(2)
4
lim
t→∞
xs,t (1 + n)
t−s
t∏
i=s+1
(1 + r˜s,i)
= 0, xs,s = 0,
where δ = γβ (1 + n), xs,t the amount of the inheritance received by an indi-
vidual born in period t, while r˜s,t+1 = rt+1
(
1− τ ks,t+1
)
and w˜s,t = wt
(
1− τ ls,t
)
are the net-of-tax factor prices.
The FOCs of this problem imply:
δt−sUc1s,t = ps,t (3)
δt−sUls,t = −ps,tw˜s,t (4)
δt−sβUc2s,t+1 = ps,t
1
(1 + r˜s,t+1)
(1 + r˜s,t+1) (1− τxs,t)ps,t+1 = ps,t (1 + n) , (5)
where the expression Uj is the partial derivative of the utility function with
respect to argument j = c1t , c
2
t+1, lt and ps,t is the shadow price of wealth.
These conditions yield:
Uc2s,t+1
Uc1s,t
=
β
(1 + r˜s,t+1)
(6)
Uc2s,t+1
Uc1s,t+1
= γ(1− τxs,t)
Uls,t
Uc1s,t
= −w˜s,t. (7)
2.2 Firms
Under the assumption of perfect competition, in each period firms, supposed
to be identical, hire capital, K, and labor, L, services according to their
market prices (gross of taxes) and in order to maximize current period profits.
This means that, for each firm i:
dF
(
Kit−1, L
i
t
)
dKit−1
= rt (8)
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dF
(
Kit−1, L
i
t
)
dLit
= wt (9)
Note that capital is assumed to enter the production process with a one
period lag.
Assuming a CRS technology for each firm i, the profit maximization con-
ditions can be expressed, for the economy as a whole, in per worker terms,
as:
fkt−1 =
rt
(1 + pi)
(8’)
flt = wt, (9’)
where lt =
t∑
s=0
ν1s,tls,t and kt =
t∑
s=0
ν1s,tks,t with ν
1
s,t = α(1 + α)
s−t−1 the weight
of the young belonging to dynasty s in the whole young population in period
t.
2.3 The government and market clearing conditions
The government is assumed to finance an amount of exogenous public ex-
penditure by levying taxes on inheritance, capital and labor income and by
issuing debt. In order to rule out the problem of time inconsistency, we sup-
pose that the government has access to a commitment technology that ties
it to the announced path of distortionary tax rates whenever the possibil-
ity of lump sum taxation arises5. The only constraints on the possibility of
debt issuing are the usual no-Ponzi game condition and the initial condition
B0 = B. Thus, one obtains the usual equation for the dynamics of aggregate
debt:
Bt = (1 + r)Bt−1 +Gt − Tt, (10)
where Tt =
t∑
s=0
[
1+n
2+n
Ds,t
(
τ ls,twtls,t + τ
x
s,txs,t
)
+ 1
2+n
Ds,t
(
τ rs,trt
c2s,t
1+rt
+ τ rs,trt
xs,t
1+rt
)]
,
which can also be written, in per worker terms, as:
5In a dynamic setup, as far as capital income is concerned, there exists an incentive
for the government to deviate from the announced (ex-ante) second best policy, upon
achieving the instant in which it should be implemented; this is so because the stock of
accumulated capital ex-post is perfectly rigid and now should be taxed more heavily than
announced, since its taxation has a lump sum character. The commitment hypothesis
implies also that the capital income tax at the beginning of the policy is given, that is,
fixed exogenously at a level belonging to the (0, 1) interval.
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bt =
(1 + rt)
(1 + pi)
bt−1 + gt − τ t. (11)
Finally, the market clearing condition implies that, at each date, the sum
of capital and debt equals aggregate private wealth in per worker terms (at),
that is:
at = kt + bt. (12)
3 The Ramsey problem
Since we adopt the primal approach to the Ramsey (1927) problem, a key
point is restricting the set of solutions to those allocations that can be de-
centralized as a competitive equilibrium6. Thus, in this paragraph we define
a competitive equilibrium and the constraints that must be imposed on the
policymaker problem, in order to achieve such a competitive outcome.
The first constraint is the so-called “implementability constraint”, i.e. the
individual budget constraint with prices substituted for by the FOC’s of the
individual maximization problem (for the derivation see Appendix A.1):
∞∑
t=s
δt−s
(
Uc1s,tc
1
s,t + Uls,tls,t + βUc2s,t+1c
2
s,t+1
)
= 0, ∀s (13)
which is referred to as the “implementability constraint”.
As for the second constraint, summing eq. (2) over population to get
aggregate wealth, subtracting eq. (10) and exploiting the market clearing
condition, we get, in per worker terms:
yt > c1t + c2t + kt −
kt−1
(1 + pi)
+ gt, (14)
where cit =
t∑
s=0
νis,tc
i
s,t and ν
i
s,t = α(1 + α)
s−t−i , i = 1, 2 is the ratio of the
young (i = 1) and old (i = 2) belonging to dynasty s to the whole young
population in period t.
Such expression is usually referred to as the “feasibility constraint” (see
Appendix A.2 for a formal derivation).
We can now give the following definition:
6See Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980); on the other hand, the “dual” approach takes prices
and tax rates as control variables (see, for instance, Chamley, 1986).
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Definition 1 A competitive equilibrium is: a) an infinite sequence of
policies pi =
{
τ ks,t, τ
l
s,t, τ
x
s,t, bt
}∞
0
, b) allocations
{
c1s,t, c
2
t+1, ls,t, kt
}∞
0
and c)
prices {wt, rt}∞0 such that, at each instant t: b) satisfies eq. (1) subject to
eq. (2), given a) and c); c) satisfies eq. (8′) and eq. (9′); eqs. (14) and (11)
are satisfied.
Such allocations are often referred to as “implementable”.
In the light of the definition given above, the following proposition holds:
Proposition 1 An allocation is a competitive equilibrium if and only if it
satisfies implementability and feasibility7.
3.1 Solution
Suppose that the policy is introduced at the end of period 0. In order to ana-
lyze the policymaker’s problem, we introduce the following auxiliary function:
Ws =
∞∑
t=s
δt−s
[
2∑
i=1
µi
s,t
βi−1U i + λs
(
Uc1s,tc
1
s,t + Uls,tls,t + βUc2s,t+1c
2
s,t+1
)]
.
The problem can thus be written as follows:
max
{c1s,t,c2s,t+1,ls,t,kt}∞0
∞∑
s=0
Ws
sub
yt > c1t + c2t + kt −
kt−1
(1 + pi)
+ gt, ∀t
lim
t→∞
kt
t∏
i=1
(1 + fki)
= 0, kt0 = k,
where λs is the multiplier associated to the implementability constraint (and
usually interpreted as the deadweight loss of distortionary taxation), µis,t is
the weight that the government attaches to individuals belonging to dynasty
7The first part of the proposition is true by construction. The proof of the reverse (any
allocation satisfying implementability and feasibility is a competitive equilibrium) follows
a standard procedure and is available from the authors upon request.
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s as for time t and period of life i8. Note that, contrary to previous studies,
we allow µis,t to vary with time, age and dynasty
9.
The FOCs with respect to c1s,t, c
2
s,t+1, and kt are, respectively
10:
∂Ws
∂c1s,t
= φt
∂c1t
∂c1s,t
⇒ δt−sUc1s,t
[
µ1
s,t
+ λs
(
1 +Hc1s,t
)]
= φtν
1
s,t
(15)
∂Ws
∂c2s,t+1
= φt+1
∂c2t+1
∂c2s,t+1
⇒ δt−sUc2s,t+1
[
µ2
s,t
+ λs
(
1 +H
c2s,t+1
)]
= φt+1ν
2
s,t+1
(16)
φt =
[
1
(1 + pi)
+ fkt
]
φt+1, (17)
where Hc1s,t =
(
U
c1s,t
+U
c1c1s,t
c1s,t+Ulc1s,t
ls,t
)
U
c1s,t
, which is usually referred to as the
“general equilibrium elasticity” of (first period) consumption,H
c2s,t+1
=
(
U
c2s,t
+U
c2c2s,t+1
c2s,t+1
)
U
c2s,t
,
the “general equilibrium elasticity” of (second period) consumption, and φt
is the multiplier associated to the feasibility constraint.
Reiterating eq. (15) one period forward and dividing it by eq. (16), we
get:
Uc1
[
µ1s,t + λ (1 +Hc1)
]
βUc2
[
µ2s,t + λ (1 +Hc2)
] = φtν1s,t
φt+1ν
2
s,t+1
and, by exploiting eqs. (6), (8’) and (17) and by reckoning that
ν1s,t
ν2s,t+1
=
(1 + pi), we get:
1 + r˜s,t+1
1 + rt+1
=
µ2s,t + λ
(
1 +Hc2s,t+1
)
µ1s,t + λ
(
1 +Hc1s,t
) , (18)
8We omit the government budget constraint since, by Walras’ law, it is satisfied if
the implementability and feasibility constraints hold. Note that µi
s,t
does not multiply
the implementability constraint, otherwise
∞∑
t=d
δt−d
(
Uc1s,tc
1
s,t + Uls,t ls,t + βUc2s,tc
2
s,t
)
= 0
would not hold for all s.
9Farhi and Werning (2005) obtain a time varying social discount rate by assuming that
the government values the welfare of future generations directly.
10We omit the solution for ls,t for the sake of brevity.
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which provides the implicit expression for the optimal capital income
tax11.
By obtaining the FOC for c1s,t+1 and dividing it by eq. (16), we get:
(1 + n)Uc1s,t+1
[
µ1s,t+1 + λ
(
1 +Hc1s,t+1
)]
Uc2s,t+1
[
µ2s,t + λ
(
1 +Hc2s,t+1
)] = ν1s,t+1
ν2s,t+1
,
which yields:
τxs,t = 1−
µ1s,t+1 + λ
(
1 +Hc1s,t+1
)
µ2s,t + λ
(
1 +Hc2s,t+1
) . (19)
The implicit expression of the overall tax hitting savings for bequest is:
(1 + r˜s,t+1)
(
1− τxs,t
)
1 + rt+1
=
µ1s,t+1 + λ
(
1 +Hc1s,t+1
)
µ1s,t + λ
(
1 +Hc1s,t+1
) . (20)
4 Discussion of the results
Eqs. (18) and (19) show that there are two forces driving taxation as a whole:
the first one depends on the evolution of the general equilibrium elasticity of
consumption, the second one stems from the evolution of the social weights.
In particular, as far as capital income taxation is concerned, the first
force arises from the difference between the general equilibrium elasticity of
consumption in the first (Hc1s,t) and in the second period of life (Hc2s,t+1); the
second reason for nonzero capital income taxation is due to the difference in
the weights assigned by the government in the first (µ1s,t) and in the second
period of life (µ2s,t+1).
As for the inheritance tax, the two forces are, respectively, the difference
between the general equilibrium elasticity of consumption of young (Hc1s,t+1)
and old (Hc2s,t+1) people in the same period of time; and the difference in
the weights assigned by the government to individuals belonging to different
generations (µ1s,t+1 vs. µ
2
s,t+1).
The first factor has been widely discussed in the literature. As for cap-
ital income taxation, Hc1s,t = Hc2s,t+1 obtains, for example, if one assumes
11Note that we do not have any condition ensuring that the tax rate will be in the (0, 1)
interval, while it is possible that such a rate keeps sticking at the upper limit for a (finite)
period of time since the introduction of the policy. However, in the rest of the work we
maintain the assumption of interiority of the equilibrium tax rates for t > 0.
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that the utility function is homothetic in consumption and (weakly) sep-
arable in consumption and leisure. Otherwise, there is a force leading to
taxing/subsidizing future consumption if consumption demand is getting
more/less inelastic, respectively. Moreover, this factor marks the difference
between the ILRA and the OLG-LC models as for the steady state result: in
fact, in OLG ones, differently from the ILRA framework, Hc can vary with
age even at the steady state. However, as shown in eq. (18) and eq. (19),
even in the absence of a life cycle, in the present model the nonzero tax rule
can still apply, because of the presence of a second factor. The same con-
siderations apply as for the inheritance tax. Thus, the second force driving
taxation can be isolated by supposing Hc1s,t = Hc2s,t+1 = Hc1s,t+1 = Hc
12.
Then, eq. (18) becomes:
1 + r˜s,t+1
1 + rt+1
=
µ2s,t+1 + λ (1 +Hc)
µ1s,t + λ (1 +Hc)
(21)
and eq. (19) becomes:
τxs,t = 1−
µ1s,t+1 + λ (1 +Hc)
µ2s,t+1 + λ (1 +Hc)
. (22)
As for the choice of the social weights, we can consider some exemplifying
cases.
1) µi
s,t
= µ
s
. The weight is assigned to the dynasty by the government
and is constant through time (and individual life). This implies the absence
of both capital income and inheritance taxation: eq. (21) becomes 1+r˜s,t+1
1+rt+1
=
µs+λ(1+Hc)
µs+λ(1+Hc)
= 1 and eq. (22) becomes τxs,t = 1 − µs+λ(1+Hc)µs+λ(1+Hc) = 0. Since the
weights assigned to individuals do not vary during their life and equal those
assigned to their own children, there is no welfare gain in distorting individual
choices.
2) µ1s,t = µ
2
s,t 6= µ1s,t+1. The weight assigned by the government to a repre-
sentative individual belonging to dynasty s is constant through life, though
varying among generations of the same dynasty; in particular, let us suppose
that it equals the share of the young people belonging to dynasty s within the
whole young population when the individual is born
(
ν1s,t
)
; by inspection of
eq. (21) it is immediate to see that the capital income tax is zero, since there
is no reason to discriminate against an individual’s own future consumption;
as for the inheritance tax, instead, in eq. (22)
µ1s,t+1
µ2s,t+1
=
ν1s,t+1
ν1s,t
= 1
(1+α)
, in-
dicating a positive rate: given migration, the children’s weight within the
12This would be the case, for instance, in a CES function.
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population is lower than their parents’ one; as a consequence, the govern-
ment discriminates in favor of an individual’s own consumption and against
descendants’ one.
3) µ2s,t+1 = µ
1
s,t+1 6= µ1s,t. The weight is assigned by the government to
the dynasty, so that the parents’ weight equals their children’s one; however,
differently from case 1), the dynasty’s weight varies through time; in this case
the capital income tax is different from zero. In particular, let us suppose,
in application of the Benthamite approach, that the social weight of each
dynasty is equal to its actual demographic weight within the population, i.e.
µs,t =
Ds,t
Nt
= α(1+α)
s−t(2+n)
(2+pi)
. The relative size of each dynasty is decreasing
through time, so that
µs,t+1
µs,t
= α
(1+pi)
and, hence, the tax rate is positive13.
In other words, the government values future consumption more than the
dynasty does and consequently uses the capital income tax to correct its
consumption path. The inheritance tax is instead zero: since µ2s,t+1 = µ
1
s,t+1,
there is no reason to discriminate within a dynasty between donor’s and
donee’s consumption.
4) µ1s,t 6= µ2s,t+1 6= µ1s,t+1. The weight assigned in the first period of life
is different from that assigned in the second period of life and from that
assigned to one’s heirs. In particular, suppose that µ1s,t = ν
1
s,t, µ
1
s,t+1 = ν
1
s,t+1,
µ2s,t+1 = ν
2
s,t+1. Since the demographic weight is higher when young than when
old, from eq. (21) we get that capital income is taxed; and, since the weight
assigned to parents is lower than their children’s one, estate is subsidized
(
ν1s,t+1
ν2s,t+1
= (1 + α)). However, this subsidy does not completely outweigh the
burden of interest income taxation, so that saving for bequeathing, though
being discriminated against with respect to own present consumption, is
favored over own future consumption (see eq. (20)).
5) µ1s,t = µ
1
s,t+1 = µ
1 6= µ2s,t = µ2s,t+1 = µ2. The government assigns a
constant weight to the young in each period, equal to their share within the
population (µ1s,t = µ
1
s,t+1 =
(1+n)
(2+n)
), and a constant weight to the old, equal to
their share within the population (µ2s,t = µ
2
s,t+1 =
1
(2+n)
). Again, the capital
income tax is positive, since consumption of the young is weighted more
heavily than consumption of the old, given the higher demographic weight
of the former with respect to the latter (
µ2s,t+1
µ1s,t
= 1
1+n
). As for the inheritance
tax, since the ratio of the weights in eq. (22) equals (1 + n), inheritance is
subsidized: children’s consumption is favored with respect to their parents’
13See also De Bonis and Spataro (2004). Note that, if (1 +Hc) < 0, the tax could
be negative. In the CES case, as shown by de la Croix and Michel (2002), section 3.4,
such a case is incompatible with the convexity of the implementability constraint. Hence,
(1 +Hc) ≥ 0 and the tax rate is positive.
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one, given the higher demographic weight of the young with respect to the
old. This subsidy outweighs the effect of the capital income tax, so that
savings aimed at bequeathing are tax exempt. This can also be seen from
eq. (20), where µ1s,t = µ
1
s,t+1 (and Hc1s,t = Hc1s,t+1 = Hc).
Note that in all cases the rationale for taxation derives from Pigouvian
arguments. In fact, the results would apply even if lump sum taxes were
available, i.e. for λ = 0. In fact, allowing the social weight to vary with time
and age turns out to be equivalent to assuming a constant intergenerational
discount rate and a social intertemporal discount rate that differs from the
individual one. Thus, varying dynasty’s weights lead the government to
correct private accumulation of capital.
5 Conclusions
Analyzing the inheritance tax within the optimal taxation framework and
in a parallel to the capital income tax produces the following results for an
economy characterized by OLG and disconnection originating from migra-
tion.
First, in line with the traditional analysis, scope for a differential treat-
ment of consumption in different life periods (capital income tax) and of own
future and descendants’ consumption (inheritance tax) arises if the general
equilibrium elasticity of consumption varies between life periods and between
generations, respectively.
Second, we find that an independent role is played by the weight attached
to the individual utility functions by the government within the social welfare
function. If these weights correspond to the actual demographic weights, the
disconnection brought in by migration is the underlying reason for a nonzero
optimal tax.
In all cases presented in this work the rationale for taxation can be re-
conducted to Pigouvian correction.
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6 Appendix
6.1 Derivation of the implementability constraint
In order to obtain the implementability constraint, write eq. (2) in its in-
tertemporal form:
∞∑
t=s
(
c1s,t + c
2
s,t+1 − ws,tls,t
)
t∏
i=s+1
(1 + r˜s,i)(1− τxs,t)
= 0. (23)
Since
U
c1s,t
U
c1s,t+1
(1+β)
n
= ps,t
ps,t+1
=
(1+r˜t+1)(1−τxs,t)
n
, we have
1
nt−s
t∏
i=s+1
(1 + r˜s,i)(1− τxs,t) =
ps,s
ps,s+1
ps,s+1
ps,s+2
...
ps,t−1
ps,t
.
By substituting into eq. (23), we obtain
∞∑
t=s
(
c1s,t + c
2
s,t+1 − ws,tls,t
)
ps,t
ps,s
= 0
and exploiting the FOCs from the individual maximization problem, we get
∞∑
t=s
(
n
1 + β
)t−s (
Uc1s,tc
1
s,t + Uc2s,t+1c
2
s,t+1 + Uls,tls,t
)
= 0,
which is eq. (13) in the text.
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6.2 Derivation of the feasibility constraint
To derive the feasibility constraint, first aggregate eq. (2) over young popu-
lation at time t:
t∑
s=0
D1s,tas,t =
t∑
s=0
D1s,t
[
(1 + r˜) (1− τxs,t)as,t−1 + w˜tls,t − c1s,t − c2s,t(1− τxs,t) (1 + n)
]
, (24)
where D1s,t is the number of young people in dynasty s at time t, and by re-
calling that At ≡
t∑
s=0
D1s,tas,t, and
t∑
s=0
D1s,t
as,t−1
(1+n)
= At−1, we can rewrite eq.(24)
as follows
At = (1 + rt)At−1 + wtLt − C1t − C2t − Tt,
where C1t =
t∑
s=0
D1s,tc
1
s,t and C
2
t =
t∑
s=0
D2s,tc
2
s,t, where D
2
s,t is the number of old
people in dynasty s at time t,
Finally, by subtracting eq. (10) and exploiting the market clearing con-
dition we obtain
Kt = (1 + rt)Kt−1 + wtLt − C1t − C2t −Gt
which, in per worker terms, becomes
kt =
(1 + rt)
(1 + pi)
kt−1 + wt − c1t − c2t − gt.
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